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Abstract
The stol.v of East Asian miracle economies now appears to have been one part illusion and
another part nuontelttarv bingeing that hwolved massive mobilization of inputs that contributed
to unsustainable growth spurts. Those who detected a new form of capitalism in Japan's deve-
lopment neodel or in that of its East Asian proteges will be disappointed to find that there is not-
hing Heir under even the rising sun.
Currency Meltdown and Asset Deflation
After several decades of impressive growth, various Southeast Asian countries were hum-
bled by it wave of speculative forays that revealed weaknesses in their economic fundamentals.
A currency meltdown and a regional momentum of asset deflation started at the beginning of
July 1997 when Thai authorities severed the baht's peg to the dollar. In short order, shock waves
rippled through the region's currency and stock markets. In the initial round, there were preci-
pitous declines in the Thai baht, Indonesia's rupiah, Malaysia's ringgit, the Philippine peso, and
the Singapore dollar. Meanwhile, the stock exchanges in most of these countries are on a down-
ward slide of a wild roller coaster ride.
It appears that there is ample evidence prompting a reappraisal of the long-term health and
performance prospects of the Asian miracle economies. In retrospect, the signs of impending
economic weaknesses that are so evident in much of Southeast Asian were ignored by overea-
ger investors. Among the signs were ballooning current account and trade deficits that made
fixed Values in terns of a rising dollar unsustainable.
At the same time, the increasing demands of global capital markets required more flexible
responses to external shocks. Unfortunately, the institutional framework associated with the
East Asian development models hampered the self-adjusting mechanisms of their markets.
Initially, trade deficits occurred in response to declines in demand for electronics in North
America and Europe. Meanwhile, an inflow of foreign capital contributed to an exacerbation of
these imbalances. In the case of Thailand, a considerable fraction of the investments that were
credited with high rates of economic growth were in property development that added a one-
shot boost in incomes.
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Consequently, the fixing of the local currencies to the dollar became untenable as the US
currency appreciated against the other important currency for the region, the Japanese yen. With
their currencies overvalued and with a coddled banking sector undisciplined by market forces.
the miracle economies became over-leveraged both in US dollar and local currency terms. At
the same time, bank loans to the overheated property markets in the region constituted a peri-
lously high percentage.
Despite some announcements by the leadership of the Southeast Asian economies of plans
to move up the value-added chain, diminishing returns set in as an internal source of slow
growth so that productivity in manufacturing sectors began to lag. Inevitably, the sources of
comparative advantage for many Southeast Asian economies began to slip away.
While policy makers inside the region were fiddling despite the looming problems, policy
makers outside the region did little to clarify these issues. In some cases, public sector officials
were entrapped by diplomatic niceties and so avoided official criticisms about the looming pro-
blems in East Asia. In the private sector, multinational corporations active in the region were
too busy feathering their own nests, often serving as spokespersons for governments in the
region to cement cozy relationships.
At the same time, upbeat financial analysis were offered by investment advisors queuing up
to sell securities for the region's governments. All this smoke and mirrors could not hide the
faultlines that had formed from the heavy property overhangs, inappropriate government policy,
and the realities of shifting comparative advantage.
Baht-ulism and the Tequila Crisis
In 1994. problems with the dollar peg of Mexico's currency caused a similar currency melt-
down in other parts of Latin America. Similarly, knock on effects of Thailand's adjustments
indicate that such problems can rock an entire region. However, these shared woes are avoida-
ble if financial markets are sufficiently exposed to international competition and if the banking
system is sufficiently grounded by the rule of law.
Interestingly, at the time of the free fall in the value of the peso and the shock waves felt in
much of Latin America, there was a momentary pause to ask whether Southeast Asia might be
in for a similar ride in the future. This questioning was provoked by some minor hiccups in
valuations in the Asian emerging markets. Clearly, there was inadequate introspection by all
parties that led them to overlook an impending crisis when the otherwise clear signs began to
emerge in early 1996.
There are a variety of striking similarities and decisive differences in the Mexican melt-
down and the baht breakdown. Unfortunately, both incidents were seen as an opportunity for
increased government intervention as a remedy for the problems at hand. The proposed reme-
dies involved a case of international corporate welfare to benefit Japanese and American banks
that were exposed to heavy losses.
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In the case of Mexico. a $40 Killion rescue program was organized by the Clinton admi-
nistration to try to bailout Mexican banks and to protect foreign lenders. Of these funds, $20
billion came from the US with the IMF providing most of the rest with some support from
Canada, the World Bank and the InterAmerican Bank. Mexico's currency crisis was principally
caused by the inflow of hot capital lured in by high returns on government securities. In parti-
cular, a substantial amount of funds went into the Tesobono market for government debt issued
in pesos but indexed to the US dollar.
In the case of Thailand, the Japanese government tried to induce the IMF to establish a spe-
cial fund to bail out Asian monetary basket cases. Actions taken in both instances were based
upon looking after the interests of the larger banks that were otherwise exposed to heavy los-
ses. During the IMF - World Bank meeting in Hong Kong in September, Japan launched a pro-
posal for a new emergency rescue fund of $US100 billion that would be financed and used
exclusively by Asian countries.
Its aim is to restore some sense of control over their own destinies since it could be used to
defend national currencies against speculators. It also serves as a statement of Asian solidarity,
whereby neighbors hand together in face of outside adversaries. It also serves to weaken
American influence in the region by excluding the US while providing Japan with a mechanism
to increase its economic and political leverage over the rest of Asia. The proposal would make
Japan the fund's largest contributor and its controlling shareholder.
Certainly the biggest problem with repetitive government intervention in the capital mar-
kets is the moral hazard that emerges from bailing out banks or countries that make mistakes.
Provision of an escape mechanism from paying the full costs of poor planning or inept policies
will only encourage bigger and more costly errors. Whereas the market sends signals to clear
up messes, public sector intervention sends a signal that the costs of fixing the mess will be pic-
ked up by someone else. The result that greater risks will be taken is inevitable.
One of the lessons that should have been learned from earlier monetary crises is that poli-
tical leaders should act quickly to restore confidence in their economies. This lesson seems to
have been lost on some in East Asia. In particular, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad announced himself to be a sworn enemy of international currency speculators and
called for the regulation or outright banning of foreign exchange trading. The Malaysian ring-
git declined to its lowest level since independence after losing about 30 percent of its value.
Putting the Tigers Back on Track?
Optimists point to the general openness of Southeast Asian economies and their past suc-
cesses in export-led growth. However, this is not possible unless there is a substantial diversi-
fication in their current product mix. Even if the correct path is known today, there will be con-
siderable time lags before specific enterprises can enact the necessary changes.
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In all events, actions by government officials have limited the capacity of' their economic.
to respond. The weakening of their currencies might have prompted corrections in their trade
imbalances by making their exports cheaper and imports dearer. However, these effects may he
offset by central bank actions to raise interest rates to bolster the currencies or by regulatory
obstructions to the market's self-adjusting mechanisms.
Meanwhile, shrill accusations against foreign and domestic speculators and attempts to
interfere with their activities undermined confidence when steps should have been taken to
calm, not roil, markets.
While high savings rates in the East Asian economies were coincidental with high growth
rates in the recent past, there success depended upon access to mature markets in the West. As
these markets become increasingly contested, continued growth in Asia's miracle economies
will increasingly depend upon internal demand. Much of the high savings has been squandered
by ill-starred industry policy or banking crises.
In theory. floating currencies should force these economies to become more flexible and
adaptable to changing market conditions. As a practical matter, however, it is doubtful that it fre
ely floating exchange rate will overcome the rigidities in other institutional areas to prevent
further crises in Asian economies. While pervasive corruption blocks rapid adjustment in many
of the East Asian economics, an inherent conservatism also impedes necessary responses. For
example, despite pressing economic need to reform lending and disclosure practices, Japan's
banking sector remains enmeshed in the bureaucratic snares that contributed to the property and
asset bubble that burst in the late 1980s. Financial institutions in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia
face similar problems due to outmoded lending practices to businesses based upon asset values
instead of cash flow. Clearly, basing loans on surges in property values is a recipe for disaster.
To date, efforts to improve disclosure by Asian banks have borne little fruit. For example,
new regulations require Thai banks to disclose the proportion of non-performing loans in their
portfolios. This reform has been averted by the willingness of loan officers to reclassify these
had debts as restructured, regardless of whether the extension of more relaxed terms reasonably
insures ultimate repayment. The damage from these write-offs is unlikely to be limited to the
Thai financial establishment.
A worse case scenario is a hard landing from the bursting of the region-wide property Nub-
ble. This scenario arises out of the problems in Thai financial markets that initially set of'f' the
run on the baht that might be repeated in some of the neighboring countries. The knock-on
effects will be felt by firms that provide support for other financial interests throughout
Southeast Asia that are equally dependent upon the property markets.
Those who think that these miracle economies can grow their way out of the problem
through their tried and tested model of export-led growth may be in for it rude surprise. In the
first instance, many of these tamed tigers are running sizable and growing current account defi-
cits due to saturation of their export markets. These deficits are being enlarged by the effect of
large foreign capital inflows. Second, China's 75 percent excess capacity in manufacturing will
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make it increasingly difficult for their East Asian competitors to find buyers . In sum, what is
happening in Southeast Asia is more than a passing hiccup . It is just the beginning of an adjust-
ment phase to the new wave of global competition.
,Japan ' s Development Model
The recent decline in Japan's economic fortunes has been as dramatic and complex as the
rapid growth spurt that made it the world's second largest economy. As measured by the Nikkei
average, values on the Tokyo stock market arc now less than one-half of what they were in the
late 198Os, in an increasingly volatile market. A similar deflation has occurred in prices of other
assets, including commercial properties. Indeed. Japan's economy has been in a no-growth or
slow-growth recession for all of the 1990s. A cautionary tale might lie in Japan's experiences
for those neighboring countries that have followed the Japanese economic development model.
Initially, the Japanese economy seemed to benefit from the corporatism associated with the
iron triangle of industrial relations wherein businesses, bureaucrats, and politicians interacted
harmoniously to promote growth. especially in the export sector. Many of the arrangements in
the ensuing social contract involved high degrees of government intervention in economic
affairs. These interventions included so-called lifetime employment as a payoff to workers and
restrictions on competition for domestic producers from their foreign competitors. More benign
policies involved the promotion of specific export-oriented industries that were expected to pro-
vide a spark to other sectors of the economy. The impressive economic performance of Japan's
corporations in concert with the helplid hand of government officials seemed to herald the
emergence of a new and superior scheme for development. The message seemed to he that other
countries should follow this model or ignore it at their peril.
For much of the post-War period, Japan and many of its East Asian neighbors enjoyed a vir-
tuous cycle of high rates of domestic saving and high investment in productive capital. This
Cycle was encouraged by positive and relatively high real interest rates, accompanied in many
cases by policies that encouraged foreign direct investment of multinational corporations
(MNCs). Recently, it has been Japanese MNCs that have increasingly provided the external
capital that has aided the growth enjoyed by its neighbors.
Now there is good reason to question the performance of the development approach initia-
ted by Japan and followed by other East Asian governments. In the West, economic growth
apparently emerged from gains in productive efficiency stimulated by individuals who harnes-
sed the forces of scientific creativity and initiated technological advance. While Japan's deve-
lopment model was guided by government initiatives, growth in the West depended upon
decentralized entrepreneurial initiatives.
Similarly, many Asian Pacific countries share Japan's traditions for the reliance of human
interaction upon group cohesion and harmony. Given the success of the high-growth East Asian
economies, it is legitimate to ask whether Western individualism is a necessary component of
growth or if the communitarian practices of East Asia constitute the appropriate model for deve-
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loping countries in the next millennium. Individualist cultures encourage and reward initiative
and invention while collectivist cultures promote passivity and imitation. Put bluntly, it remains
to he seen whether an East Asian parasitic approach to adopting new technologies can outstrip
the more original, creative set of forces of the West.
In keeping with the notion of social harmony, many Asian academics tend to display it
lockstep tendency towards education. In such a setting, it is doubtful that Asian universities can
provide the environment for lateral and creative thinking required of a homegrown class of
entrepreneurs.
Asian universities too often operate as factories for the production of state bureaucrats.
Intellectual debate is neither necessary nor appreciated by herds of students who are heing trai-
ned to follow rules and to adhere unquestioningly to authority. This point was confirmed by for-
mer Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa who pointed out that the rote-learning edu-
cational system common in Asia endangers his country's future.
For those countries dependent upon the transfer of technology from other more creative cul-
tures, mastering the high art of imitation (or indulging in the low art of industrial espionage) is
necessary to move up the innovation curve. To a great extent Asian countries have compensa-
ted for a lack of original creativity through it high imitation capability that is apparently higher
than shown by Europeans and Americans.
It appears that as economics mature, the presumed benefits associated with corporatism
play out and inhibit the performance of those firms that operate principally in the less competi-
tive domestic market. Accustomed to being sheltered from competition, these firms and entire
industries will lag in terms of productivity and profitability as markets become increasingly glo-
halized. In time, regulations that once provided a firewall from the heat of international rival-
ries eventually smother the vital flame of the protected domestic enterprises.
Indeed, the Japanese corporations that are thriving are those with the greatest exposure to
global competition. Most Japanese MNCs with offshore operations, especially automobile and
electronics producers, have restructured according to the demands of international market for-
ces.
Unfortunately, Japan's domesticated corporations that operate behind a protective wall of
regulations designed to keep out foreign competition are facing financial difficulties. Perhaps
the most vulnerable sectors in Japan are the insurance and domestic banking industry. Thus,
Japan's economy has a bifurcated structure. It is composed of healthy and profitable internatio-
nalized firms with promising prospects while many domestic firms and most banks have a ren-
dezvous with an increasingly bleak future.
What are the lessons from all this! These observed events apparently repudiate the notion
of a superior Japanese or East Asian management model. Recently, it has become evident that
Korea's economy has begun to confront the same sort of realities experienced by Japan's more
nimble MNCs that were forced to undertake the restructuring strategies initiated by their
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Western counterparts. Then there are the currency crises sweeping through Southeast Asia that
have caused international investors to rethink placing their capital in that region. The decline in
Thai haht by over 20 percent was followed by devaluation of, Indonesia's rupiah, Malaysia's
ringgit, the Philippine peso, and the Singapore dollar. Even the Hong Kong dollar has been
under assault. Meanwhile, the stock exchanges in most of these countries have been on roller
coaster rides.
In short, there is little new under the sun. Faced with the realities of the new global eco-
nomy, those countries that encourage their enterprises to hide behind protectionist barriers will
inhibit the prospects for continued growth. Adam Smith would certainly not be surprised or
impressed by such suggestions.
Institutional Failure
Those who wish to assess whether the economic tigers of East Asia can provide global lea-
dership in the next millennium need look no farther than the smoke-filled skies around the sou-
thern rump of the region. Parts of Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei were covered
by an acrid and noxious ha,-, e from fires that have ravaged several hundred thousand
acres in neighboring Indonesia for the month of August and into September. The choking smoke
threatened the health of an estimated 20 million people in the region. The haze may obscure the
views in the capitals of these Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) stalwarts, but
it makes perfectly clear that the ASEAN's leaders are incapable of dealing with regional pro-
blems. It beggars the imagination that such leadership could offer guidance to the rest of the
world any time in the near future.
Little has been done to alleviate this problem which has been recurrent with the last and
most serious bout in 1994. In keeping with its commitment to be a fully-wired Island, the
Singaporean authorities offer full-color satellite pictures of the source of their affliction on a
weh site. Singaporean authorities dutifully report hourly measures of Pollutant Standards Index
(PSI) for the enlightenment of their suffering masses. In Malaysia, there has been furtive
attempts to seed any cloud that might blow over the peninsula. Flights have been delayed, can-
celed or re-routed and airports closed in Indonesia. However, there has been no summit to
address a repetitive problem that threatens the health of citizens. With smoke blocking visibi-
lity in the Straits of Malacca, the lifeline of Southeast Asia, the economic health of the region
is similarly threatened.
With no place to hide, Indonesian authorities have finally admitted that the source of the
problem is within their jurisdiction . However, little has been done other than fine a few planta-
tion owners who set the fires and threaten others with legal action . Unfortunately , there is little
evidence that the rule of law pervades policy thinking in Indonesia or among most of the other
ASEAN countries.
Instead of putting regional heads together, Malaysian authorities have turned to France and
Canada for advice on an action plan to deal with the problem. With no efforts toward finding
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regional initiatives for short-term responses. it is not surprising that there is little pro^gre^^
toward a long-term solution to this chronic problem.
When the problem arose in 1994, it met with the same lack of inter-governmental respon-
se. As then, children, the infirmed and elderly in Singapore have been instructed not to venture
out of doors as the PSI soared above the wnccalthful threshold. It was reported that doctors have
seen a 20 percent increase in patients complaining of respiratory problems. In Kuala Lumpur,
levels signaled a re rv unhealth%ul situation. A plan for an emergency evacuation of Sarawak is
being mooted as the levels reach hazardous levels there. Perhaps the most fitting symbol of this
whole muddle is that Malaysia's architectural monument to it own success, the Petronas Towers
which is the world's largest building, is shrouded by an impenetrable fog.
Inaction and refusal to comment on the internal affairs of their partners is a defining cha-
racteristic of ASEAN relations . The quiet diplomacy of the ever- pragmatic ASEAN leaders is
based upon brotherly solidarity which is a code for avoiding confrontations that might lead to
the loss office by neighboring regimes. While this orientation towards consensus building has
been touted as a great strength of ASEAN, there are clear signs that this problem solving appro-
ach breaks down when more complicated issues are at hand.
The indifference of the regimes in this region to such crises lends support to the unfortu-
nate perception that individuals are worth little in Asia. This response is understandable in the
context of regimes based upon patriarchal, collectivist ideals where society is placed above sell.
Many of the ASEAN leaders insist that Asians are not interested in for promoting individual
liberty or protecting individual rights.
The root of the problem is the lack of political will to take decisive actions. However, the
search for solutions is also complicated by the prevalence of corruption in much of East Asia,
itself a form of policy pollution. In Indonesia, corruption as nepotism makes it more difficult to
resolve the effects of the slash and bw-n clearing of the rainforests of Java, Sumatra and
Kalimantan. It is rumored that part of the area being burned is part ofjoint developments invol-
ving some of Indonesian president Suharto's children.
As reported by the Asian Development Bank, East Asia is already facing "staggeringly high
costs" from environmental damage. These costs will only rise in the future until governments
in the region are more accountable.
Those who expected an impending Asian Century may be disappointed to know that it has
just gone up in smoke.
Speculators and Market Failure?
A common thread ran through the media reports of the assault on the weakened currencies
of some East Asian miracle economies. Most government officials portrayed currency specula-
tors as a pestilence preying on their good countries.
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The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, has been conspicuous in vilifying
the American billionaire George Soros publicly as a "racist," "moron" and "criminal."
Unfortunately, Dr. Mahathir is not alone in his buffoonery and slander. Other leaders in the
region have expressed deep anger with US speculators like George Soros whom they blame for
aggravating the region's unfolding economic crisis. Most portray it as something more than
pure market speculation. ASEAN leaders, representing an entire region and more than half a
billion people, issued a joint communique darkly blaming "outside forces" for "well co-ordina-
ted efforts to destabilize" their currencies and their economies.
In fact, such exaggerated depictions are not only untrue, but they are also a distraction from
the underlying economic realities often put into motion by the same self-righteous politicians.
Their misrepresentations are an enduring fiction often trotted out when emperors fear that their
nakedness will he noticed by others. At moments of crisis or unrest, politicians often hoodwink
their citizens with unifying themes not well understood by the masses. And so it is that they ser-
ved up for images of currency traders as detestable individuals who become rich by inflicting
suffering upon others.
Politicians and finance ministry officials denounced speculators who targeted their curren-
cies as people determined to ruin their economies. Their own citizens were branded as traitors
while foreigners were portrayed as agents of some dark international conspiracy.
A basic understanding of economic principles' provides another view. Quite literally, spe-
culation is the norm for successful economic activity. In essence. it is the act of boring low and
selling high. Rewards are provided to those who make correct predictions about the future just
as punishments are the fruit of imprudent choices.
Examples of everyday experience with speculative behavior involve stock market purcha-
ses or sales or the activity of a firm to hold inventories of raw materials in advance of anticipa-
ted price rises. Even the search for a bargain or responding to clearance sales involves the same
impulse whereby something is bought at a momentarily lower price. In short, anyone participa-
ting in most market transactions often behaves in a speculative manner. Therefore, we are all
equally guilt' as are those who look for weaknesses in the economic fundamentals behind an
exchange rate policy of a given country.
Despite this simple truth, many politicians assert that speculative behavior is harmful due
to a presumption of destabilizing consequences. However, in absence of political interferences,
markets tend to he generally stable despite extensive speculative activities that constantly occur.
Most economists agree that speculation may actually reduce price variations. This is becau-
se speculators tend to he knowledgeable about the markets where they look for profit opportu-
nities. As specialists, they will attempt to buy things when prices are low and sell when a hi-
gher price is offered. Prices tend to be low when people wish to buy less than is available at the
current price. This is what economists refer to as excess supply as might be observed in agri-
cultural markets after an unusually abundant harvest.
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Such a situation oflCrs speculators all opportunity to buy when there is an over-abundance
in order to sell at a later date (or in another place) when less of a good might he produced. The
speculator takes over the costs of storage and risks of lower prices in the future that would have
to he borne by the producer who may have been unable to absorb these costs or risks.
Amazingly, all parties can be made better off by these transactions. The producer benefits
by selling more products and avoiding additional costs and risks. They may also he protected
from a complete collapse in prices due to the presence of speculative buying of the surplus.
Consumers are better off' since there will he a more stable flow of commodities and at less vola-
tile prices.
Finally, the speculator receives the differential in buying and selling prices. Part of this pro-
fit is a compensation for absorbing risk and part is a compensation from the community for pro-
viding a service to them.
Of course, if speculators guess wrong. this could lead to destabilization of prices. However,
speculators tend to be specialists in specific markets and are less likely to make serious errors.
It they do make consistent had judgments, they will be eliminated due to financial losses.
The same logic holds true for currency speculation. From the end of June and early part of
July, the currencies of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand were besie-
ged by speculators. Basically, certain foreign exchange traders believed that these countries'-
respective monies were over-valued in the international market, almost always due to govern-
ment intervention.
For example, they would borrow Thai haht and sell it immediately at its over-valued price.
If the speculators guessed right, they could repay their debt by buying back the baht at a lower
price. This meant that they earned a profit by selling at it high price and buying hack at a low
price while pocketing the differential. Of course, if they guess wrong or if there is no change in
the value of the currency before the initial debt must he repaid. then the speculator will lose
money.
Ironically, the opportunities for speculation arose from government policies that meant that
the rate of exchange for these currencies was based more upon a political decision rather than
wider economic fundamentals. Unfortunately, neither wishful thinking nor good intentions are
a substitute for sound economics.
So, when searching for the identity for who are the speculators and profiteers in a market
economy, we should begin by looking into the mirror.
If we are looking to find faults when currency speculation occurs, we should point to the
politicians and bureaucrats who shape or enforce economic policies. Speculators are not the
cause of the underlying problems that lead to currency devaluation; they are only the messen-
gers of the bad tidings. Leaders of those countries wishing to avoid an unhappy experience with
currency speculators should put their own house in order.
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Global Capital and the Future
The increasing integration of financial markets with the increasing flow of private capital
to developing countries is probably the hallmark of the global economy. While each country
will have its own unique experiences and teething problems, the overall expectation should be
that there will be opportunities for widely shared improvements in overall wealth.
These expectations stem from enhanced efficiency that will facilitate trade and promote
growth. Countries with underdeveloped financial markets will be able to tap into a modern
financial system and will learn how better to channel their own savings for domestic projects
including necessary infrastructural investments. It should also he easier to attract more stable
commitments of financial capital and foreign direct investment.
However, credible mechanisms must be implemented to assure investors of the ability and
willingness to enforce contracts and protect private property rights. Despite a widespread
impression to contrary, East Asian governments tend to be highly active in guiding their domes-
tic markets. In many instances, market access and outcomes are based upon political connec-
tions. Therefore, deregulation will be more difficult since it requires profound changes in poli-
tical culture.
As such, much of East Asia has a long way to go before internal reform and the initiation
of market innovations can break the logjams imposed by bureaucratic entrenchment and over-
regulation . This is most clearly evident in the resistance to change among Japanese technocrats
despite the heavy burden of costs from continued hesitation . These costs will only mount in face
of several trillion dollars of non - performing loans and a stagnating domestic economy.
The story of East Asian ntiraclcc economies now appears to have been one part illusion and
another part momentary bingeing that involved massive mobilization of inputs that contributed
to unsustainable growth spurts. Those who detected a new form of capitalism in Japan's deve-
lopment model or in that of its East Asian proteges will be disappointed to find that there is not-
hing new under even the rising sun.
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